Ding Ding... Round One

May Donoghue and Walter Leechman embarked on a formidable legal challenge by filing a writ against David Stevenson in Scotland's highest civil court, the Court of Session. They contended that Stevenson's negligence in the manufacturing process led to the Paisley Snail being sealed within a bottle of ginger beer, causing Donoghue significant harm. They sought £500 in damages, hoping and assuming that Stevenson would prefer to settle the matter discreetly rather than risk his reputation in a public trial.


Contrary to their expectations, Stevenson staunchly denied any responsibility for the incident. He was adamant in his refusal to offer any compensation, signaling a preparedness to defend his case in court. To fortify his defense, Stevenson enlisted the services of George Morton, an advocate with a formidable reputation in both the legal and political spheres.


Morton's approach was simple - he sought to discredit the foundation of  May Donoghue's claim. According to Morton, the writ neither adequately detailed a breach of duty nor demonstrated any direct harm suffered by Donoghue. He also restated the existing law that as May was not the buyer of the ginger beer, there was no legal link between her and Stevenson i.e. no privity of contract.


The responsibility of deliberating over these arguments fell to Lord Moncrieff, a judge in the Outer House of the Court of Session. On the 9th of March, 1929, Lord Moncrieff delivered a judgment that would become a landmark in legal history. He meticulously addressed the objections raised by Morton, concluding that Donoghue's writ was neither vague nor lacking in substance.


In his judgment, Lord Moncrieff affirmed the writ's validity, recognizing it as clearly outlining a cause of action against Stevenson. He found that the writ successfully identified a breach of duty and linked it to the damage suffered by Donoghue. Importantly, he established a legal connection between Stevenson and Donoghue, countering Morton's arguments.


Lord Moncrieff acknowledged a duty of care that bridged manufacturers and consumers, marking a significant step in the recognition of consumer rights. He identified Stevenson's negligence and linked it to the causation and damage experienced by Donoghue, effectively bypassing the issue of privity of contract that Morton had highlighted as a barrier to the claim.


The principles of negligence, centered on foreseeability and proximity, underpinned Lord Moncrieff's decision. This approach not only resonated with existing Scots law but also broadened its scope by drawing on precedents from other jurisdictions. It was a clear indication of the law's adaptability and its capacity to evolve in response to societal needs and realities.


By setting aside Morton's objections and requiring Stevenson to respond to Donoghue's writ within eight days, Lord Moncrieff underscored the court's commitment to justice. Both Walter Leechman and May Donoghue saw it as a validation of their efforts and a positive sign for the progression of their case.


The judgment was a significant milestone, but Donoghue and Leechman were aware that it was only the beginning of a longer legal journey. They recognized that the complexities of the case and the legal issues it raised meant that their legal battle was far from over. However, they had won round one, and the fight was on.


For Walter Leechman, it was no longer just about a 'Snail in a bottle'. The case was about to transcend the specifics of a contaminated bottle of ginger beer, and it was set to challenge and potentially reshape established legal doctrines. It was now a test case for consumer protection rights, with the potential to influence the development of negligence law, both in the United Kingdom and ultimately the wider world.


But David Stevenson was not finished yet. Quite the contrary! And if the Inner House would not support him, he would take it to the Inner House.